Even before Vladimir Putin arrived in Beijing last month to strengthen the “no holds barred” partnership between Russia and China, Western media had begun to emphasize the widely held view that the war in Ukraine had not only increases. brought Beijing and Moscow closer together. While not unfounded, these incidental observations demonstrate an incomplete understanding of Beijing’s geopolitical complexities and strategic views and obscure recent subtle but important changes in the Sino-Russian partnership. For not only has the balancing power of this relationship shifted further in favor of Beijing, but deep-rooted flaws in the relationship have also emerged. A look at the two countries’ evolving memory policies reveals how Beijing, as a newly emerged senior partner, is pursuing a significantly different policy agenda from its now junior partner in Moscow.
May is a month full of historical symbolism in Russia. On May 9, coinciding with his first day in office for a new six-year term as head of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin oversaw a military parade in Moscow to mark the 79th anniversary of the victory of what is known in post-Soviet states as the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. In his address to the nation, as in previous years, he paid tribute to the fallen heroes and veterans of the former Soviet Union who liberated Europe from Nazism and condemned Western attempts to distort this historical “truth”. Putin also reserved praise for the contributions of other Allies but, unlike last year when he expressly recognized Highlighting the contributions of the United States and Britain, this time he highlighted China and the courage of the Chinese people in their resistance to militaristic Japan.
A week later, Putin arrived in Beijing for his first official visit as a newly elected leader. In a interview On the eve of his visit, Putin praised the cooperation between the two countries during World War II, highlighting China’s contribution to the Allied victory. The Russian president even went so far as to assert that “it was China that held back the major forces of the Japanese militarists, thus allowing the Soviet Union to concentrate on defeating Nazism in Europe.” To the Chinese public, this does not seem unusual, as it is consistent with Beijing’s policies. recently revised official reading of the history of the Second World War. From a Russian perspective, however, this is a striking concession that indicates a major shift from Moscow’s policy. usual story that it is the Soviet Union that deserves the main credit for having defeated not only Nazi Germany but also Imperial Japan.
These changes in Moscow’s rhetoric about the Great Patriotic War and the contributions of its former allies demonstrate two things. First, Moscow abandoned its efforts – which continued even until last year – to reach out to the United States to revive the “spirit” of cooperation from this common past. This is very clear from the harsh language of this year’s Victory Day speech, in which Putin lambasted “Western elites” who have a policy of “stoking regional conflicts, inter-ethnic and inter-religious conflicts and containing the centers sovereign and independent. of global development. Secondly, this change in rhetoric implies that Moscow admits a change in balance in its relations with its main “brother in arms” of yesterday and today. Where, until not so long ago, China ostensibly served as the country ‘junior partner’ In Moscow’s speech on World War II, Putin’s remarkable statement confirms that the roles are now reversed.
But while Putin opted for a bellicose and anti-Western memory policy, the opposite happened for his country. close friend Xi Jinping. After a growing trend of joint war commemorations, which saw Beijing and Moscow align their war commemorations for several consecutive years since 2015, China’s leaders suddenly changed course in 2022. Faced with growing pressure at home over their policies zero Covid and international retaliation regarding By refusing to denounce Russian aggression in Ukraine, Beijing has since adjusted its memory strategies by shifting attention away from World War II to focus on contemporary crisis response and consolidation efforts peace, and so subtly dissociating his historic speech from that of Moscow. A telling sign is that, unlike in previous years, no prominent Chinese leaders attended Russia’s Victory Day in 2023 and 2024.
A second hint that Beijing is careful not to escalate tensions with the West was offered this month during Xi’s state visit to Serbia. In what was widely seen as a highly symbolic gesture, the Chinese leader arrived in Belgrade on May 7, precisely 25 years after US stealth bombers dropped five satellite-guided precision bombs on the PRC embassy in Belgrade, killing three Chinese journalists and injuring 20 diplomats. . During a state visit to Serbia in 2016 – one of Europe’s key allies of China and Russia – Xi paid tribute at the site of the bombing to the three Chinese who were “martyred” in what some believe was a deliberate CIA attack on the Chinese embassy and what Beijing recently called “barbaric atrocity.’ This time, however, to the surprise of many, Xi refrained from visiting the site, apparently to avoid fueling tensions with the United States
A third indication that Beijing’s memory policy is geared toward improving relations with Washington is the recent wave of Chinese protests.exchanges between peoples‘ with family and friends of American heroes who served in China during World War II. Last summer, Xi wrote friendly letters to descendants of US Army General Joseph Stilwellwho is I remember with fondness in China today for his courage as commander of the China-Burma-India theater, and for a surviving member of the American Volunteer Group, also known as the “Flying Tigers”, who helped the Chinese Air Force oppose the Japanese invasion. While the more than 2,000 Soviet pilots who helped China at the start of the war benefit little attention in Chinese state media, these American war heroes are constantly hailed as virtuous examples of “enduring friendship between China and the United States.”
These recent trends in historical statecraft demonstrate major differences between the worldviews and strategic intentions of Russia and China. Like me and Eric S. Zhang did recently shown In a study of World War II memory, Russian official discourse tends to be characterized by strong universalizing ideological overtones that are inclined to arouse principled external opposition, while Chinese historical narratives are shaped more flexibly around ad hoc and pragmatic policy objectives in specific regions or regions. problem areas. While Moscow reactively and increasingly desperately clings to its selective reading of the past, Beijing seems instead focused on achieving a practical, proactive, forward-looking agenda. This is not a question of denying the existence of common values and strategic objectives, but of highlighting the less obvious differences and the weak ideological foundations of their declared friendship.
China’s emergence as a key partner in its relations with Russia, combined with Chinese leaders’ intention to improve relations with the US-led West, could be good news. If Beijing really thinks this is the case imperative to avoid conflicts with the United States and improve its relations, it should continue to defuse potential memory wars with the West of the type that Moscow uses to justify its aggression in Europe and which serve to precipitate and maintain a real armed conflict. He should proceed with great caution with the plans announced in last week’s report. joint statement to celebrate 80th anniversary of the victory in the Second World War in 2025 with Russia and to “jointly promote a correct historical perspective” of this war. The wisest approach would be to continue on the path chosen in 2022 towards memory diversification and de-escalation.
In the meantime, if Washington is serious in its desire to “truly stabilize, improve and move forward‘ relations with Beijing, it should consider the current state of Sino-Russian relations for what it is: a window of opportunity not only for ‘thawThis could ease bilateral tensions with Beijing, but also ensure that the latter has alternatives to drifting into Moscow’s embrace. This is not to say that the West should try to drive a wedge between China and Russia, which Xi would not allow and which would likely have the opposite effect anyway. Washington should instead exercise restraint in resorting to measures, sanctions and threats that may enjoy strong bipartisan support but ultimately serve to increase tensions, pushing Beijing deeper into embrace of Moscow and thus fuel self-fulfilling prophecies. With US presidential elections As the crisis approaches, it is doubtful whether prudent policy will be feasible before at least the end of the year; the question is whether the current window of opportunity will still be open.
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