It is tempting to view the elections to the European Parliament as the most important and unimportant elections.
Hundreds of millions of voters in 27 countries will go to the polls this weekend, but the European Parliament is the least powerful of the European Union’s institutions. It is often seen as a place for discussion. Its 720 members have limited powers, and while a few are rising stars, a few are retired politicians or even criminals.
But the European Union has never played a more important role in delivering tangible benefits to its citizens, nor to the world as a force for stability and prosperity, since its creation as an economic alliance nearly seventy years. The Parliament that emerges from these elections, however weak it may be, will serve as a brake or accelerator to crucial policies that will help shape Europe’s immediate future.
In the five years since the last election, the bloc has jointly purchased Covid-19 vaccines and launched a massive economic recovery program to recover from the pandemic. He sanctioned Russia and financed the arming and reconstruction of Ukraine. He abandoned Russian energy imports and negotiated new sources of natural gas. He overhauled its migration system. He adopted ambitious measures climate policies.
But at that time, the EU was also criticized for failing to heed demands for more accountability and transparency and for pushing policies that favor urban elites at the expense of farmers and rural voters. The loss of sovereignty to an obscure center of power in Brussels, run by technocrats, also does not sit well with many Europeans.
Exasperated by Covid-era policies and the arrival of more migrants, and desperate to regain a sense of control and identity, many voters are expected to turn to the right. The other two right-wing parties competing in these elections are poised to make significant gains.
This shift is also marked by some of the same culture war issues over gender politics, particularly in Eastern Europe, as in the United States and other parts of the developed world.
In this context, the European elections will give rise to a new compromise with the political extremes. It seems likely that centrist parties will have to work with the far right to achieve results.
If the If the projections are accurate, then Parliament could find it harder to carry out even the limited functions it has: approving EU legislation, the bloc’s budget and EU leadership positions. Smaller, more disruptive players will become more powerful. And the the far right is breaking itselfleading to greater instability in the European political process.
“Normally these elections would be of second or third order importance,” said Mujtaba Rahman, managing director for Europe at consultancy Eurasia Group. “But the vote counts because of the context.”
Never waste a crisis
The European Union is growing through the crisis. At the heart of this unique experiment in supranational governance is the idea that European countries can achieve more together than each can individually.
Nonetheless, the functioning of the bloc relies on an inherent tension between the EU’s common institutions primarily based in Brussels, primarily its executive arm, the European Commission, and the national governments of each of the 27 member states.
The commission sees itself as the guardian of a vision of a federal Europe, bringing its members together towards “an ever closer union”, according to its founding document. National governments oscillate between empowering and funding the commission and controlling it, blaming it for failures and taking credit for successes.
This weekend’s elections will send a strong signal to European leaders about which side of the scale citizens want to put their finger on. Each consolidation of power by Brussels has tended to be followed by some popular resistance, making European integration a process of two steps forward and one step back.
The pandemic is a good example. After a brutal first wave that left Europeans without sufficient access to vaccines, the EU organized the purchase of billions of vaccine doses and Europeans quickly emerged from severe confinement.
In many ways, the response was considered a success. But it has also engendered deep distrust of Brussels among voters, particularly on the right, who are wary of government excesses and may also be skeptical of vaccines.
Vaccine procurement contracts remain secret and there is a pervasive feeling that the EU has ordered too many doses and wasted taxpayers’ money. (The New York Times is suing the commission in a freedom of information case at the European Court over documents relating to these contracts.)
As a deep economic crisis hit countries and triggered sky-high inflation rates in the wake of the pandemic, the EU convinced its members to borrow money together to finance a massive recovery plan. This sort of Rubicon – borrowing together – broke new ground and arguably prevented the EU from collapsing into a deeper and longer recession.
But it was also unpopular among the bloc’s wealthier nations, who are guarantors of that debt and net contributors to the bloc’s spending. It has also angered right-wing voters in countries like Germany and the Netherlands, who say the EU is taking too much from them and not giving enough back.
The next test was Ukraine. When Russia launched a full-scale invasion, the EU sanctioned Russia in agreement with the United States and other allies. He severed ties with much of the Russian economy, ultimately abandoning it as a source of energy – and in doing so, giving up cheap access to electricity.
Today, although the United States remains Ukraine’s indispensable supporter, the EU sends billions of euros to kyiv for armament and reconstruction and offers it a future within its ranks as a full member of the EU.
For voters who say supporting Ukraine costs too much, as well as other pro-Russians, the war has become another driver of the far-right’s appeal.
In what direction now?
In the wake of such crises, national governments typically seek to reclaim some of the authority they had ceded to the EU to avoid catastrophe. This reaction is reinforced by nationalist and nativist parties who are unhappy with the loss of sovereignty from Brussels.
“The problem is that all the main areas in which the EU must now solve the problems of its citizens – competitiveness, migration, security – are issues at the edge of the EU’s competence,” Mr Rahman said.
“These are areas that define state power, and it is very difficult to get countries to cede sovereignty again and build a collective and coherent European response.”
The EU political mainstream – including the European Commission – has tried to get ahead of this trend, for example by temper green policies to satisfy the farmers who this year organized sometimes violent demonstrations across Europe.
But the EU continues to push for greater coordination when it sees a new crisis looming – common defense – something it is not very good at.
Another area where the EU is not good is foreign policy, but whether it is ready or not, these elections will determine whether the bloc can find its voice in a highly fragmented world order.
A Trump presidency could erode U.S. investments in NATO, foster faster peace in Ukraine on Russia’s terms, and shift the United States more aggressively behind Israel.
The EU would find it difficult to maintain a hard line on Russia if the United States reduced its support for Ukraine. Its promotion of international rules would also encounter difficulties elsewhere, notably in the Middle East, where it is a secondary player.
More broadly, with a stronger far right in the European Parliament, leaders aligned with Trump, such as Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban, would come to the forefront.
With nationalist parties in the coalition governments of seven of its 27 members, the EU could end up moving closer to the Trump-led United States. His own aspirations for unity to make European power felt in the world would be tested.
“I think we should be prepared to respond to drastic changes coming from the United States, but we may not be able to do so, largely because member states are not prepared to deal with them,” he said. said Shahin Vallée, senior researcher at the German Council on Foreign Relations. .
“My base case scenario is that, if Trump is elected, European leaders will individually rush to the White House to do exactly what they did last time: ask Trump for favors. »
