I find the debate over the existence of a god intrinsically interesting. Of the many arguments that exist, one of the arguments for the existence of a god that I find quite clever is Alvin Plantinga’s modal ontological argument. I’m not going to go into too much detail about this argument here, but in a very simplified and condensed form it can be described as follows. Having proposed a definition of “God”, the argument begins simply with the singular premise that the existence of such a being is at least possible. From there, he uses modal logic to go through a series of steps to arrive at the conclusion that the existence of such a being is necessarily true. The argument is logically sound, and it all follows deductively from the fairly modest premise that the existence of God is merely possible. This means that to deny the conclusion of the argument, it is up to you to challenge this first and only premise and offer a positive argument that the existence of God is impossible.
One of the main counterarguments to the modal ontological argument is to point out that there is a symmetrical argument that can be constructed to reach the opposite conclusion. That is, you can also start from the rather modest premise that it is simply possible that no god exists, and using the same logically valid steps, come to the conclusion that the non-existence of a god is necessarily true. In order to resolve this problem, we would need to propose some sort of symmetry breaker between these two arguments, such that we have a non-arbitrary reason to prefer one over the other. Philosophers and theologians have proposed a number of different symmetry breakers over the years – you can see a compilation and evaluation of them in This recently published article, if you are interested.
Why am I bringing all this up? Well, recently I job about how I find libertarianism and classical liberalism to be more focused on reciprocity than other political philosophies. I have argued that Thomas Christiano’s argument for the authority of democracy based on the obligation to respect the judgment of one’s fellow citizens fails because the obligation he speaks of (if it existed, which is far from clear!) is reciprocal in nature. As I put it there:
Even assuming that placing one’s judgment above that of others is an unacceptable fault, the situation remains mutual. If my fellow citizens say that I must do what they have decided because if I do not I consider my judgment superior to theirs and I treat them badly, I can also say that by trying to force me to do what they decide, they place their judgment above mine, placing me as inferior and treating me poorly. The situation is mutual.
I also argued that Yoram Hazony’s concerns regarding free exchange Undermining mutual loyalty among the citizens of a nation fails to start because of the same problem:
After all, what Hazony so often evokes is the idea of mutual loyalty – and the problem with mutual loyalty is that it’s mutual. The obligation goes both ways. So why would we say that I am not showing loyalty to Walter by purchasing from Carl? Why not say that Walter would not demonstrate appropriate loyalty to me by insisting that I buy from him despite the enormous additional financial burden it would impose on me? Simply saying “mutual loyalty” does nothing to solve the problem.
Like the modal ontological argument, both of these situations require a breaking of symmetry before they can reach the conclusions sought by their proponents. And that’s what I think classical liberal and libertarian thought helps to provide by focusing on the reciprocal nature of these situations. Invoking symmetry is not a semantic stop sign, designed to end conversations. It’s an invitation to move the conversation forward by pointing out that there is another factor that needs attention.
In the comments section of my previous article, commenter Dylan also pupil the question of symmetry breakers concerning repercussions. Dylan points out that in many cases, people’s moral intuitions about a situation serve to break the symmetry. I mentioned in my article Ronald Coase’s idea about the reciprocal nature of externalities – and Dylan described how widely held beliefs about particular cases will, for many people, break the symmetrical nature of the situation. As he said:
Consider the classic externality of the polluting factory: the idea that I should pay to prevent the factory from polluting (or pay to mitigate my exposure) simply seems wrong at a fundamental level, even if this solution would win out. for reasons of efficiency.
I think this accurately describes how the vast majority of people would react to this situation. Telling someone “Well why don’t you just pay this factory to install scrubbers if you are so upset about the smoke and soot falling into your yard” is just plain wrong. Most people have a strong reaction like, “They shouldn’t be blowing soot on my house in the first place – why should they?” I must pay them to make it stop?
I think that in many cases, moral considerations are a source of breaking symmetry. To take a simple example, my desire for my house not to be burned down interferes with Pyro Pete’s desire to burn down houses. Technically, we impose ourselves on each other in a reciprocal and symmetrical way. But I don’t think it’s a great moral mystery to determine what a symmetry breaker is in these circumstances. Arson is wrong, so my imposition of Pyro Pete’s wishes is morally justified in a symmetry-breaking way.
Sometimes, in situations where the moral obligation is unclear (or not enforceable), other sources of symmetry breaking exist. Sometimes social conventions and norms can break symmetry. In the justice system, a standard sometimes used is the “least-avoid” principle. Under this standard, if two parties impose on each other equally (in a way that does not clearly violate an existing law or moral imperative), the responsibility for improving the situation is placed on the party that incurs the greater cost. down to do it. If changing the situation is a major imposition for me but only a minor inconvenience for you, then it serves as a symmetry breaker in these cases.
Libertarians and classical liberals’ emphasis on reciprocity and symmetry does not arise from a desire to argue that all laws or interventions are always unjustified on the grounds that every situation is symmetrical. If that were the case, libertarians would say that a law preventing Pyro Pete from burying my house is unjustified – but I have yet to meet a pro-arson libertarian! But libertarians and classical liberals are right to point out that questions of reciprocity and symmetry exist and are important questions worth examining. Symmetry is not an insurmountable obstacle, but ignoring the problem is not justified. To the extent that libertarians and classical liberals keep this issue raised, they are doing a service to public discourse.
