Campbell Craig is Professor of International Relations at Cardiff University. He has held research fellows at the University of Bristol, the Norwegian Nobel Institute, the European University Institute and Yale University. He specializes in the history of American foreign policy, international relations theory, and nuclear policy, topics on which he has written extensively. He is the author of Destroying the Village: Eisenhower and Thermonuclear War (Columbia University Press, 1998); Glimmer of a new Leviathan: total war in the realism of Niebuhr, Morgenthau and Waltz (Columbia University Press, 2003); The atomic bomb and the origins of the Cold War (Yale University Press, 2008), co-authored with Sergey Radchenko; And The Cold War in the United States: the politics of insecurity (Second edition; Harvard University Press, 2020), co-authored with Fredrik Logevall. A list of his publications can be found here.
Where do you see the most exciting research/debates happening in your field?
One of the most interesting debates concerns the preponderance and unipolarity of the United States. Is unipolarity still relevant today? And if so, what effects will this have on American foreign policy? Another more specific debate I participate in concerns the nuclear revolution – the argument, systematically advanced by Robert Jervis in the 1980s, that the advent of thermonuclear bombs and intercontinental missiles makes major wars senseless, creates an inescapable condition of mutually assured destruction. and will force large states to value stability and make compromises in the face of fierce security competition. Recently, several scholars have challenged this argument, claiming that nuclear powers do not behave as Jervis thought and that the nuclear revolution is a “myth.” This is a very important debate, because if this new argument is accepted by those who make US nuclear policy, they will likely advocate strategies of nuclear superiority over rivals like Russia and, especially, China. Some of these new researchers believe the United States has no choice but to do so. I don’t agree with this.
How has the way you understand the world changed over time, and what (or who) has caused the most significant changes in your thinking?
I have definitely come to the conclusion that domestic politics affects American foreign policy to a much greater extent than I thought. Just look at what Biden is doing today to see how obvious this is. The person who influenced me the most on this is my co-author, Fred Logevall. In writing our history of American foreign policy during the Cold War, we worked hard to figure out how to present our arguments convincingly. One way we accomplished this was by emphasizing the “free security” effect – the fact that the United States has not normally faced imminent threats to its national survival as has did the previous great powers. This gives American politicians greater latitude to let domestic influences shape their foreign policy positions, because the chances of getting it wrong are very low. We see this happening today.
What is Trotsky’s Uneven and Combined Development and how does it differ from classical realism? Is this still relevant to modern geopolitics and the nuclear revolution?
Trotsky’s concept of uneven and combined development (UCD) is very, very close to classical realism. I highly recommend everyone to drop what they’re doing and read The work of Justin Rosenberg on UCD and his engagement with realists like Kenneth Waltz. I wrote in a article Several years ago, Marxism-Leninism was rendered obsolete by the nuclear revolution, because it envisaged (unlike classical Marxism) a major war, a war made inevitable by capitalism, as a crucial catalyst for revolution and possible global victory of Marxism. But if such a war kills humanity, then this plan will no longer work. Khrushchev realized this in the late 1950s. I consider his decision to accept the implications of the nuclear revolution to be one of the most important events of the 20th century.
You have Express that the threat of nuclear weapons can only be eliminated through the creation of a world state and an end to international anarchy. Why is this a preferable alternative to stricter enforcement of the existing non-proliferation regime?
I’m glad you asked, because I’m writing about this diet right now. The non-proliferation regime cannot rid us of the danger of nuclear war, because it does nothing, and has chosen to do nothing, regarding the arsenals of the great powers. Moreover, in recent decades it has increasingly become an explicit instrument of American foreign policy. I argue (as did Hans Morgenthau and Albert Einstein, among others) that if we want to eliminate the possibility of nuclear war, actually eliminate it, then only a world government can do the job. Complete and irreversible disarmament in a world of anarchy cannot work, as I wrote in a recent review. We can get by with deterrence, but like Martin Amis one day wrote“The problem with deterrence is that it cannot last for the necessary time, which is approximately between now and the death of the sun.” I am aware that a world government seems completely impossible, especially in recent times, and I am also aware of the dangers that accompany it. My view is that we need to look clearly at what is needed to eliminate the specter of nuclear war and accept the logical answer, no matter how utopian or eccentric it may seem. Otherwise, admit that you agree to eventually exterminate us.
What is the preponderance of power theory? What is the impact of the proliferation of nuclear weapons on the preponderance of American power?
The balance of power is a theory put forward by Dartmouth IR researchers Steve Brooks and Bill Wohlforth. They argue that the persistence of unipolarity – the fact that no state or coalition of states has attempted to match American power since the end of the Cold War – can be explained by realistic factors. The gap in military and especially technological capabilities between the United States and other countries is so vast that potential rivals conclude that it is simply too difficult to close. Additionally, these potential rivals are all located in the Eastern Hemisphere, meaning that if they attempt to build military power to take on the United States, they run the risk of alarming neighboring states and sparking competition. regional security situation that they would prefer to avoid.
As me both And Nuno Monteiro As argued, nuclear proliferation poses a fundamental problem for a dominant United States, because if you can procure a small arsenal of nuclear weapons, you can deter American coercion and attacks. If the United States wants to use its dominance to get other countries to do what it wants, it cannot let them acquire the bomb. This is why, as I wrote above, the United States has had an interest in dominating the non-proliferation regime since the end of the Cold War.
The possible use of Russian tactical nuclear weapons against Ukraine has become a major concern in 2022. Is the use of nuclear weapons in a conventional war realistic and what would be the impact and implications?
I think it is very unlikely that states would deliberately use nuclear weapons in a conventional war, unless it is a war of survival. And if you have nuclear weapons, it is very unlikely that another state will attack you in order to threaten your survival: this has never happened since 1945. Would Russia or another state use one in a conventional war against a non-nuclear adversary who possesses them? does it not threaten its survival? Again, this is highly unlikely, as the costs of doing so, including the possibility of escalation to broader nuclear war, far outweigh the benefits. On top of that, a state that resorted to nuclear weapons in a war like this would become a pariah state on a global scale. Nina Tannenwald argues. I think it’s actually more likely that a nuclear weapon would be used in a situation like this, accidentally or inadvertently, because something went wrong or someone was going crazy.
Do you foresee any future changes in policy or attitude toward nuclear weapons?
I do. We are witnessing today, whether it is protests against Gaza or actions against climate change, a new generation who sees politics as usual as unsustainable and reprehensible. New ongoing work on nuclear weapons and disarmament points in the same direction. However, as I said above, I don’t think disarmament can work without getting rid of anarchy, and I don’t see how it is possible to get rid of anarchy through popular and political politics. popular. I would love to be convinced otherwise on this last point.
What is the most important advice you could give to young researchers in international relations?
The main advice I would give is to not aspire to work in government. If you do this, you will be incentivized to avoid writing or saying anything that might prevent you from getting political office, and that is not what academics are supposed to do. I firmly believe that I was able to achieve career success at a relatively young age by writing about what I thought was important, rather than what I thought would improve my prospects for working in foreign policy. Doing what I did gives you a competitive advantage.
Further reading on international electronic relations
