This is the second in my series of articles on the social costs of drug prohibition. You can read the first post here.
In 1878, Congress passed Title 18 USC §1385, commonly known as Law on the comitatus of groups, to address the question of the use of the army for civilian purposes of maintaining order. Previous uses of the military, e.g. to quell rioters during the Whiskey Rebellion (1791 – 1794), ended in disaster, prompting lawmakers to prohibit the use of military personnel to enforce national law except in defined circumstances. The underlying problem with using the military for such purposes lies in its function; because soldiers are trained to neutralize or eliminate the problem, issues of due process or civil liberties are not their primary concern (Marsh, 1991). In enforcing national law, civilian police must visibly protect civil liberties while enforcing the law.
However, these lines have become increasingly blurred in the pursuit of the War on Drugs™. In 1981, the Military Cooperation with Law Enforcement Act (MCLE) was passed. allow the army to cooperate with local law enforcement to more vigorously pursue interdiction of traffickers. The MCLE allowed the military to expand police access to military bases, research, and equipment, as well as provide training on the use of military equipment (Cooper, 2015) . In 1997, Clinton expanded transfers to local departments in the form of the 1033 program, giving preference to departments engaged in anti-drug and anti-terrorism activities. Subsequent laws, such as the Defense Drug Interdiction Assistance Act of 2011, provided even more assistance to – and cooperation between – the military and local law enforcement in the name of resolving transmission, sale and use of prohibited drugs.
Not only did state and local law enforcement take advantage of the equipment and intelligence, but they also adopted the manners and techniques of combat operations through the formation of elite paramilitary groups. Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) Units, Special Response Teams (SRT) and Police Paramilitary Units (PPU). These units were once an exception, with their roots in incidents such as the Watts Riots and the Texas Bell Tower shooting in the late 1960s (MacDonnell, 2016). The idea behind these units was that they would act as a force of last resort in situations where normal units would be unable to respond, particularly in cases where the suspected criminals were likely to be heavily armed. Although the original SWAT team formed by the Los Angeles Police Department under the leadership of Officer John Nelson and future police chief Detective Daryl Gates captured the public imagination, it remained largely part an anomaly before 1973.
The declaration of war on drugs created a confluence of interests that motivated these paramilitary police units. Now, not only are they a vital part of major metropolitan police departments, but many smaller departments also employ them. At least 90% of departments serving a population of at least 50,000 citizens have created some sort of SWAT or PPU unit. That’s not so surprising, since the willingness to divert enforcement resources to align with Washington’s mission to eliminate drugs translates into a bonanza in equipment, training and sharing free or low-cost information. As a bonus, this paradigm is perpetuated; The less effective interdiction and community cleanup efforts are, the more justified there is in spending more to double down on these efforts.
It should be noted that despite the large number of resources given to these units, only a small number of officers receive this training and serve on them, and many of them eventually return to regular duty. Therein lies the problem; As these officers trained to view traffickers, suppliers and users as enemies to be defeated in the hostile terrain of their community blend back into regular units, their views have been observed to greatly influence their colleagues. officers. Williams and Westall (2003) found that despite the difference in likelihood of suspicious violence between calls for SWAT and non-SWAT officers, the difference in the use of deadly force between the two groups is negligible.
In this way, the police moved away from the crime prevention model towards that of maximizing arrests. As peacekeeping has given way to the pursuit of confrontation, the possibilities for creating that confrontation have multiplied, from no-knock home searches to traffic stops targeting would-be drivers carrying large sums of cash. This confrontational approach naturally increases the risk of violence, a subject which will be discussed in more detail later. Some researchers estimate that SWAT units are deployed at a conservative rate of 60,000 times per year, with 62 percent of those deployments executing warrants related to drug offenses, often using techniques such as no-knock raids. Paramilitary police units have also been used to patrol high-crime areas in full riot gear, exacerbating the image of communities under siege.
In my next article, I will address the issue of civil asset forfeiture.
Tarnell Brown is an economist and public policy analyst based in Atlanta.
